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RE-KANTING POSTMODERNISM?: 
DERRIDA'S RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF 
REASON ALONE 
James K. A. Smith 
This essay considers the legacy of Kant's philosophy of religion as appro-
priated by Jacques Derrida in his recent, "Foi et savoir: les deux sources de 
la 'religion' aux limites de la simple raison." Derrida's adoption of this 
Kantian framework raises the question of how one might describe this as a 
postmodern account of religion, which in turn raises the question of the 
relationship between modernity and postmodernity in general, and 
Derrida's relationship to Kant in particular. Following an exposition of 
Derrida's notion of a formal "ethical" religion as a repetition of Kant's cri-
tique in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, I offer a critique of 
Derrida's (and Kant's) "formalization" of religion and the relationship 
between faith and reason, arguing that a more persistent postmodernism 
requires a de-formalization of the modern concern for justice, appreciating 
its determinate prophetic origin. 
Could it be that deconstruction-offspring of enfant terrible, Jacques 
Derrida-is in fact only a new attempt to liberate humanity from its self-
incurred tutelage? In other words, is deconstruction simply a new 
Enlightenment, a project we can trace to Kant? And conversely, could it be 
that Kant was (unwittingly) engaged in deconstruction? Derrida himself 
seems to hint at just such a genealogy, suggesting something of a German 
origin of this French movement: "I am resolutely in favor," he proclaims, 
"of a new university Enlightenment [Aufkliirungl."l And more recently, 
expressly evoking the Kantian tradition of critique, he has undertaken the 
task of considering religion "within the limits of reason alone"-a "religion 
without religion"2 which, in the spirit of Kant's "reflective faith,'" would 
constitute a "universal" religion.4 For Derrida, like Kant, such a religion is 
ultimately a matter of ethics or justice, such that the "religion" which 
Derrida discloses is remarkably similar to Kant's "moral religion," includ-
ing the tie which binds it to democracy.' Further, this plays itself out with-
in a framework which understands the relationship between faith and 
knowledge in a manner we might describe as "hyper-Kanhan," faulting 
even Kant for failing to radically think religion within the limits of reason 
alone-for not being enlightened enough (FS 19/11). Thus Derrida, the 
consummate "postmodernist," lays claim to a filiation which is distinctly 
modern, making deconstruction a child of the Enlightenment. 
Derrida's appropriation of Kant when reflecting on religion, along with 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 
Vol. 17 No.4 October 2000 
All rights reserved 
558 
RE-KANTING POSTMODERNISM 559 
his affirmation of a new Aufkliirung, raises the question of the (dis)continu-
ity between modernity (and Kant, in particular) and what has been com-
monly described as "postmodernity." Is postmodernity a "new 
Enlightenment?" If so, in what sense is it "new?" Derrida's philosophy of 
religion and his account of the relationship between faith and reason seems 
to be little more than a repetition of Kant's own account, and thus subject 
to the same critique as other Enlightenment accounts of the "essence" of 
religion (FS 34/23), of which Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason 
Alone is a celebrated example." Further, this specter of Kant (evoked by 
Derrida himself), problematizes accounts of postmodernism which posit a 
radical discontinuity with the modern, Enlightenment projece Instead, it 
seems that these purported "postmodern" accounts of religion differ little 
from Enlightenment criticisms. For some, this would be a redeeming trait 
of postmodernism. But what if that Enlightenment critique of religion was 
itself subjected to criticism? In that case, Derrida would here simply be 
repeating one of the most problematic Enlightenment prejudices against 
determinate or "dogmatic" religion-a prejudice that should be unveiled 
as such (pace Gadamer8) and subject to (postmodern) critique. 
The goal of this paper is to provide an exposition of the way in which 
Derrida repeats Kant's project of thinking religion within the limits of rea-
son alone (concurrently pursuing questions about the relationship between 
modernity and postmodernitt) and its disclosure of a purportedly "pure" 
moral religion, and then subject such a project to a more persistently post-
modern (and perhaps Augustinian) critique, developing an alternative 
understanding of the relationship between faith and reason. 
1. Thinking Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone: 
Derrida's Repetition of Kant 
The occasion for Derrida's reflection on religion is the surprising "return of 
religion" (FS 13/5); or better, the so-called "return" of religion which sur-
prised only a post-Marxist or post-Feuerbachian academic community-
which is to say, a post-Kantian, post-Enlightenment community.lO But why 
is this so surprising? Does it not only surprise those who naively opposed 
religion and science (Enlightenment, Reason, Criticism)-"as though the 
one could not but put an end to the other" (FS 13/5). Instead, Derrida 
argues, a different "schema" will be required to think the relationship 
between faith and knowledge, suggesting that Derrida will provide an 
alternative to the Enlightenment notion of an "autonomous" reason which 
is untainted by faith (found in Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Feuerbach). Here 
several problems arise which need to be explored. First, does Derrida real-
ly provide an alternative schema for the relationship between faith and 
knowledge, or is his conception of this relation in fact a hyper-modern 
notion of "autonomous" reason-a repetition of Kant? Second, is this cri-
tique of religion-whether found in Kant or Derrida, whether modern or 
postmodern-a philosophically viable project, or is it itself subject to cri-
tique? Third, are there other elements of Derrida's analysis of religion 
which undermine his attempt to think religion within the limits of reason 
alone, resulting in the deconstruction of Derrida's critique?! I The first 
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question is taken up in Part I, and the final two questions are the focus of 
Part II. 
For Derrida, in a gesture he describes as Kantian (FS 16/8), the question 
of religion opens as a question of abstraction: 
How "to talk religion?" Of religion? Singularly of religion, today? 
How dare we speak of it in the singular without fear and trembling, 
this very day? And so briefly and so quickly? [. .. J To give oneself 
the necessary courage, arrogance or serenity, perhaps one must pre-
tend for an instant to abstract, to abstract from everything or almost 
everything, in a certain way. Perhaps one must take one's chance in 
resorting to the most concrete and most accessible, but also the most 
barren and desert-like, of all abstractions (FS 9/1). 
Thus abstraction becomes linked to a discussion of "salvation" and libera-
tion; but here a question arises: "Should one save oneself by abstraction or 
from abstraction" (FS 9/1, emphasis added)? Derrida seems to opt for the 
former: in order to speak of religion, one must ("perhaps") engage in 
abstraction from the concrete and determinate religions ("almost")-a kind 
of flight to the desert, separated from the particularity of historical, determi-
nate religions in order to discover, in this desert of abstraction, a "universal" 
religion whose structure is a relation of justice. By this process of "desertifi-
cation" (FS 27/17), Derrida proposes to disclose a structure of ethical obliga-
tion which precedes the structures of determinate religion and morality: 
"Even if it is called the social nexus, link to the other in general, this fiducia-
ry 'link' would precede all determinate community, all positive religion, 
every onto-anthropo-theological horizon" (FS 26/16). In other words, this 
process of abstraction exhibits a basis of ethical responsibility which does 
not depend upon any conditions of experience (cp. RWLRA 94-96). 
Abstraction, then, is the movement by which Derrida seeks to disclose 
the religious structure of responsibility, or the outline of a "pure moral reli-
gion" lifted out of the determinate and concrete historical religions. 
Throughout "Foi et savoir," Derrida takes up this question of the relation-
ship between the universal and the particular (or better, the universal and 
the singular'2)-so central to Kant's ethical framework as outlined in both 
the Groundwork and RWLRA-through the metaphor of topos: of place 
(lieu), location. Could there be a religion which is not tied to a particular 
place-a "Promised Land"Ll-and so a particular history of revelation (FS 
17/8)? For if the foundation for ethical obligation were to be located in a 
particular religion, with ties to a particular revelation and place, we would 
compromise its universality. But it is precisely this penchant for universal-
ity which pushes Derrida to the "desert" of abstraction. As he reflects on 
the Isle of Capri, these particular individuals who have gathered to "talk 
religion" share "an unreserved taste, if not an unconditional preference, for 
what, in politics, is called republican democracy as a universalizable 
model" (FS 16/8)-an ideal which can be traced to the lights of the 
Enlightenment and the project which sought liberation from all external 
authority and power, especially religious dogmatism. l4 And thus our 
predilection for republican democracy as a univ('Ysal ideal would seem to 
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commit us to a certain epoche-thinking religion "within the limits of rea-
son alone" (FS 16/8), which for Derrida is to think religion "in the desert." 
The "desert," for him, is a kind of metaphor for a level of abstraction or 
universality which is disconnected from all particularities of place and his-
tory, such that this "desert" of abstraction would represent a "place that 
could well have been more than archi-originary, the most anarchic and 
anarchivable place possible" (FS 26/16). Elsewhere, this desert of abstrac-
tion is described as a place that is not a place, a 'place' which "comes under 
no geography, geometry, or geophysics."ls Once this epoche is effected, 
the ethical structures of democracy which 'remain' are understood as a pri-
orjl6-divorced from any particular historical or geographical heritage, 
even if they maintain a certain affinity with particular determinate reli-
gious traditions. 
It is Kant's notion of a "reflective [reflektierende] faith" which Derrida 
describes as "a concept whose possibility might well open the space for our 
discussion" (FS 19/10, trans. modified). This is a faith which "does not 
depend essentially upon any historical revelation and thus agrees with the 
rationality of purely practical reason" (FS 19/10), which is why it is 
opposed to "dogmatic faith" which "claims to know and thereby ignores 
the difference between faith and knowledge" (FS 19/10). There is an 
important difference, he notes, between 'believing one knows and know-
ing one believes" (FS 54/40). Reflective faith has been purged of its partic-
ularity, immune to any contamination of time or place. Thus, while Kant 
remained indebted to his Pietist heritage,J7 the impetus for his reflections 
on religion was philosophical, and more specifically, the telos of his own 
critical project, such that Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone has been 
described as a kind of "fourth critique." At the heart of this Kantian project 
is a distinct concept of the relationship between faith and reason, presaged 
in the famous dictum from the Second Preface to the Critique of Pure 
Reasol1: "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to 
make room for faith."IR The relationship between faith and knowledge is 
precisely one of heterogeneity: arriving at the limits of scientific knowledge, 
it is necessary to displace a dogmatic metaphysics in order to make room 
for faith and a concept of God-one of the positive implications of laying 
out the principles of pure reason. In other words, the procedures of reason 
which issue in knowledge are autonomous vis-a.-vis faith: knowledge is the 
product of operations which do not in any way involve faith, whereas our 
consciousness (not "knowledge") of freedom and moral obligation is char-
acterized by a faith which displaces any priority which speculative reason 
might seek for itselF' 
This question of the relationship-or rather, heterogeneity-between 
faith and knowledge is taken up more systematically after the ethical 
works, which further clear the space and mark the necessity for thinking 
religion within the limits of reason alone. Thus RWLRA operates with an 
understanding of the relationship between faith and reason laid down 
much earlier. But while space was cleared for religious faith through a cri-
tique of reason, faith itself is subject to critique; that is, the boundaries or 
limits must be established lest faith, as reason is wont to do, seeks to claim 
more than it can deliver. This concern is already seen in CPR, where Kant 
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remarks: "No one, indeed, will be able to boast that he knows that there is a 
God, and a future life; if he knows this, he is the very man for whom I have 
long [and vainly] sought" (A828-29/B856-57). Faith needs to be reminded 
that it is just that-faith, and not knowledge. 20 It is in the first of four par-
erga in RWLRA that this same concern is expressed by the distinction 
between "reflective" and "dogmatic" faith. Broaching the matter of grace, 
Kant suggests that "[r]eason believes this with a faith which (with respect 
to the possibility of this supernatural complement) might be called 
reflective; for dogmatic faith, which proclaims itself as a form of knowledge, 
appears to her dishonest or presumptuous" (RWLRA 48). "In making 
such assertions and pretensions to knowledge/' he later remarks, "reason 
simply passes beyond the limits of its own insight" (RWLRA 63-64), claim-
ing to know where it cannot see. In other words, dogmatic faith fails to 
recognize itself as faith, and thus fails to recognize the heterogeneity 
between faith and knowledge. 
In his lectures, Kant not only lays out this distinction but demonstrates 
why it is beneficial: faith in these matters is, in a sense, more virtuous. For 
instance, our moral belief in the existence of God is not a mere "hypothe-
sis" or "opinion" (arguing from the contingency of the world to a supreme 
author), but rather demands "firm belief" because it is from "some 
absolutely necessary datum."21 "Hence our faith/' Kant concludes, 
is not scientific knowledge, and thank heaven it is not! For God's wis-
dom is apparent in the very fact that we do not know that God exists, 
but that we should believe that God exists. For suppose we could 
attain to scientific knowledge of God's existence, through our experi-
ence or in some other way (even if the possibility of this knowledge 
cannot be immediately thought). And suppose further that we could 
really reach as much certainty through this knowledge as we do 
through intuition. Then in this case, all morality would break down.22 
Morality would break down because it would no longer be voluntary, and 
the moral agent would act out of fear of punishment rather than virtue. 
Thus, "as regards our morality, it is very good that our knowledge is not 
scientific knowledge but faith. For in this way the fulfillment of my duty 
will be far purer and more unselfish.,m Hence we can see why the confu-
sion of faith and knowledge-as in "dogmatic faith"-would in fact be 
detrimental to morality. For the sake of morality, it is imperative that we 
recognize and maintain the heterogeneity between faith and knowledge. 
The result will be a "pure religious faith" (RWLRA 94)-"rational" or 
"reflective" faith-which has both purged itself of dogmatism (RWLRA 
48,63-64) and extirpated any vestige of elements which derive from partic-
ular, determinate, historical faiths (RWLRA 94-115). The latter "kenotic" 
movement is necessary in order to achieve the universality which is 
required of a moral religion-the only "true" religion (RWLRA 95,98). 
Indeed, "a church dispenses with the most important mark of truth, name-
ly, a rightful claim to universality" (RWLRA 100; cpo 105). Thus "pure 
moral religion" stands not only in contrast to "dogmatic faith" (which fails 
to recognize the heterogeneity of faith and knowledge), but also "ecclesias-
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tical faith," which is dependent upon a particular, historical revelation 
(RWLRA 96). Kant in fact argues that the term "religion" ought to be used 
more prudently, advocating that what we describe as "religions" ought to 
be termed "faiths," since "[olne does too great honor to most people by 
saying of them: They profess this or that religion. For they know none and 
desire none-statutory ecclesiastical faith is all that they understand" 
(RWLRA 98-99). In a manner very similar to Derrida's concern regarding 
"wars of religion" in the Middle East and Eastern Europe," Kant argues 
that "so-called religious wars" were in fact devoid of religion and are only 
"wrangles over ecclesiastical faith" (RWLRA 99). 
This distinction between "faiths" which are particular, historical and 
determinate and a "religion" which is universal is reproduced in Derrida's 
own distinction between particular "messianisms" and the "messianic" as a 
universal structure. Motivated by a similar concern regarding the contin-
gency of the historical and determinate, the messianic, or "messianicity 
without messianism," is defined as "the opening to the future or to the 
coming of the other as the advent of justice but without horizon of expecta-
tion and without prefiguration" (FS 27/17). But why this latter require-
ment? Why must it be a justice which cannot be pre-determined or "pre-
figured?" Because any pre-determination would be precisely a determina-
tion, and for Derrida, it is precisely determination itself which is unjust. In 
other words, any "horizon of expectation" [horizon d'attente1 or predelineat-
ed anticipation would undo the universality of such justice, representing 
an injustice. Thus the "messianic exposes itself to absolute surprise" (FS 
28/17); it is a "general structure of experience" which denotes a responsi-
bility to the other as justice (FS 28/18). This responsibility must be deter-
mined by the other and therefore cannot be prefigured or determined by the 
subject of responsibility. As such, to delineate this general "messianic" 
structure, one must engage in abstraction, such that abstraction becomes a 
kind of liberation, an "abstract messianicity" (FS 28/18). So, this "general 
structure of experience," which is the structure of justice, 
does not depend upon any messianism [i.e., determinate religion]' it 
follows no determinate revelation, it belongs properly to no 
Abrahamic religion (even if I am obliged here, "among ourselves," for 
essential reasons of language and of place, of culture, of a provisional 
rhetoric and a historical strategy of which I wiIl speak later, to contin-
ue giving it names marked by the Abrahamic religions) [FS 28/181. 
Thus, like a Kantian moral religion, Derrida's "messianic" is not dependent 
upon any historical, determinate "revelation" (cp. RWLRA 94-95). 
However, while both Kant's "pure moral religion" and Derrida's "mes-
sianic" (or "religion without religion") eschew any dependence upon par-
ticular, determinate faiths, they both still affirm the priority of faith in mat-
ters practical. Thus both are characterized by a dual movement: on the one 
hand, discharging determinate religion in the name of rationality /univer-
sality; on the other hand, displacing knowledge in order to make room for 
the faith of practical reason-justice, responsibility, la religion which is la 
reponse. The tie that binds me to the other in responsibility is, at root, a 
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bond of faith~a "fiduciary 'link'" (FS 26/16). "This abstract messianicity," 
Derrida argues, "belongs from the very beginning to the experience of 
faith, of believing, of a credit that is irreducible to knowledge and of a trust 
that 'founds' all relation to the other in testimony" (FS 28/18). This would 
be a 'universal' faith before every determinate faith, akin to Kant's "pure 
religious faith" which would be the condition of possibility for any "eccle-
siastical faith" (RWLRA 95). So "religion" ~a universal religion~whose 
structure is unveiled as the messianic (not a messianism), is in its very 
structure a relation of justice: my responsibility to the other. But it is not a 
responsibility that I know; rather, it is one that I believe. So it is necessary 
to deny knowledge in order to make room for this responsibility. And it is 
"[tlhis justice, which I distinguish from law25 [droitl, [thatl alone allows the 
hope, beyond all 'messianisms,' of a universalizable culture of singulari-
ties" (FS 28/18)~a kind of "kingdom of ends" where the singularities are 
precisely others (echoing both Kierkegaard and Levinas). This is because 
"the other makes the law, the law is other: to give ourselves back, and up, 
to the other. To every other and to the utterly other [A tout autre et au tout 
autrel" (FS 47/34). This faith inscribes itself at the very origin of language 
and thus is characterized by universality.26 And it is "the universalizable 
culture of this faith" which "alone permits a 'rational' and universal dis-
course on the subject of 'religion'" (28/18). It is a messianicity which is 
"stripped of everything, as it should [sic], this faith without dogma" which 
marks the possibility of a universal justice (FS 28/18) which leads Derrida 
to associate this founding faith with what Montaigne and Pascal describe 
as "the mystical foundation of authority" (29/18).27 
Thus the universal structure of ethical obligation, on the one hand clear-
ly disengaged from any particular faith or religion, is nevertheless itself 
'known' only by a kind of practical faith or trust. Here we see the clear 
repetition of the Kantian dual movement noted above. Further, such 
abstraction has, according to Derrida, liberating implications: "this abstrac-
tion, without denying faith, liberates a universal rationality and the politi-
cal democracy that cannot be dissociated from it" (FS 29/19). 
Kant, however, has not made it to the "desert." In fact, Derrida criti-
cizes Kant for not properly carrying out a radical abstraction or "desertifi-
cation" of moral obligation. While repeating Kant's demand that a pure 
moral religion be decontaminated of any particular, determinate, historical 
faith, Derrida concludes that such a process of decontamination was not 
properly completed by Kant. This in two ways: first, Kant continues to 
privilege the Christian religion, such that "the Christian religion would be 
the only truly 'moral' religion" (PS 19/10). Second, "pure morality and 
Christianity are in dissociable in their essence and in their concept" (FS 
19/10). In other words, it would be a contradiction for moral obliga tion to 
be purely "rational" and non-Christian and so it must remahl, in a veiled 
sense, linked to the particularity and historicity of a Christian revelation. 
"The unconditionality of the categorical imperative," Derrida concludes, 
"is evangelical. The moral law inscribes itself at the bottom of our hearts 
like a memory of the Passion. When it addresses us, it either speaks the 
idiom of the Christian~or is silent" (FS 19/11). This is why Derrida con-
siders his disclosure of the "messianic" a completion of the process of 
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decontamination. The messianic, he claims, even if it remains linked 'in 
name' to the Abrahamic religions, remains a completely universal struc-
ture of responsibility which in no way depends upon any particular reli-
gion or messianism. This, of course, does not call into question Kant's pro-
ject, but rather completes it: an unveiling of the structure of moral obliga-
tion which is decontaminated of any dependence upon a particular, deter-
minate, historical religion-and yet which is 'known' only by faith. 
II. The Very Idea of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone: 
A Postmodern Critique 
So Derrida (the postmodern) does not question the Kantian (modern) pro-
ject of thinking religion within the limits of reason alone; indeed, he takes it 
up in order to complete it. The problem which arises, for Derrida, is just 
how such a project would be possible: "How then to think-within the lim-
its of reason alone-a religion which, without again becoming 'natural reli-
gion,' would today be effectively universal" (F523/14)? But this is a ques-
tion that Kant also tackles when he considers the relationship between 
"historical" or "ecclesiastical faith" and "pure religious faith." What is the 
relationship between these two? While the latter is superior to the former, 
is ecclesiastical faith nevertheless the necessary condition for the idea of 
morality which characterizes pure religious faith? Kant is somewhat 
ambiguous on this point, though I think we can infer his answer. He sim-
ply states that, "[i]n men's striving towards an ethical commonwealth, 
ecclesiastical faith thus naturally precedes pure religious faith" (RWLRA 
97). But what does Kant mean by saying the one "naturally precedes" the 
other? This is somewhat clarified by a brief note which asserts that "moral-
ly, this order ought to be reversed" (RWLRA 97n). In other words, it 
seems that Kant argues that "morally" -which must also mean "rational-
ly" -pure religious faith is prior to any ecclesiastical faith, but historically 
speaking, ecclesiastical faiths are the means by which we come to reflect on 
and understand the "one true religion." In the order of knowing, ecclesias-
tical faith is prior, but in the order of being, pure religious (i.e., moral) faith 
comes first. Thus Kant routinely refers to historical or ecclesiastical faiths 
as "vehicles" for the propagation of pure religious faith: "it remains true 
once for all that a statutory ecclesiastical faith is associated with pure reli-
gious faith as its vehicle and as the means of public union of men for its 
promotion" (RWLRA 98).28 And eventually, one would hope pure reli-
gious faith could makes its way around on its own, no longer needing a 
ride from ecclesiastical faith. As Kant projects: 
When ... an historical faith attaches itself to pure religion, as its vehi-
cle, but with the consciousness that it is only a vehicle, and when this 
faith, having become ecclesiastical, embraces the principle of a contin-
ual approach to pure religious faith, in order to finally dispense with 
the historical vehicle, a church thus characterized can at any time be 
called the true church (RWLRA ] 06). 
The job of the church, then, as a still particular historical faith, is to work 
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itself out of a job, to no longer be needed as a promoter for pure religion. 
As a kind of "tutor" to the moral law, ecclesiastical faith plays only a 
propadeutic role. Derrida, as we have noted above, questions this genealo-
gy, suggesting that the roles of father and son have been reversed-that, in 
fact, the Categorical Imperative remains, by filiation, Christian and hence 
both dependent upon and product of a particular, determinate "ecclesiasti-
cal" faith (FS 19/10-11). 
This question of precedence or conditions also arises, not surprisingly, 
in Derrida's very Kantian approach to the issue. For Derrida, the question 
is: does the messianic or "religion" here outlined precede determinate mes-
sianisms as their condition of possibility? Or is it possible to sketch this 
universal messianic structure only on the basis of particular, determinate 
revelations? 
The question remains open, and with it that of knowing whether this 
desert can be thought and left to announce itself 'before" the desert 
that we know (that of the revelations and retreats, of the lives and 
deaths of God, of all the figures of kenosis or of transcendence, of reli-
gio or of historical "religions"); or whether, "on the contrary," it is 
"from" this last desert [historical religions] that we can glimpse that 
which precedes the first, which I call the desert in the desert (FS 31-
32/21). 
While here Derrida seems content to remain undecided, even advocating 
"tolerance" (PS 32-33/21-22), this response to the question is disappointing 
and, in truth, a punt on Derrida's part. This is not a question of ethical 
"undecidability" (which is a condition of all decisions which demands pre-
cisely that one decide) but simple indecision on his part, since either possi-
bility (and I cannot see other options) would be problematic for him on his 
own grounds. He would either end up siding with a particular determinate 
religion (and here it is precisely his Enlightenment penchant for universality 
which prevents him from doing so), or for a purely transcendental struc-
ture-also a deconstructive heresy.2o Further, he has earlier already 
answered the question, opting for the latter stance: the "messianic," he has 
told us, "does not depend upon any messianism, it follows no determinate 
revelation, it belongs properly to no Abrahamic religion" (FS 28/18). The 
messianic, then, as a priori, is a transcendental condition for all particular, 
determinate religions and is itself immune from any particular faith. 
Here I would unpack two criticisms of Derrida, which also constitute 
criticisms of Kant and the general modern project of thinking religion with-
in the limits of reason alone. First, affirming Derrida's unveiling of the 
determinate "evangelical" heritage of the Categorical Imperative, we must 
subject Derrida's claims to the criticism he leveled against Kant, viz., that 
the ethical structure disclosed by this process of desert abstraction retains 
very distinct geo-political ties: to Abrahamic, Western understandings of 
ethical obligation and to political democracy. In other words, the elements 
of this "general structure" remain determined by a particular time, history, 
and place. And indeed, one of the' articles of faith' of deconstruction is that 
it could not be otherwise; as a result, both Kant and Derrida's own project 
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of a "purely rational religion" must falter on this inescapable particularity. 
It is true that Derrida claims that the messianic is "Abrahamic" only in 
name (FS 28/18). But if so, then why that name? Why not another?30 
Could this ethical structure be described as "kharmic" or "Taoist?" Why 
not? Because in the end--or rather, in the beginning-it remains an under-
standing of ethical obligation which owes its disclosure to a determinate 
prophetic (more specifically, Hebrew31 ) tradition, the same tradition which 
gave birth to Kant's Categorical Imperative. Further, it remains committed 
to a very determinate political ideal: republican democracy.32 While 
Derrida does concede that our understanding of this moral obligation is a 
matter of faith, he fails to recognize that it is also particular and determi-
nate. However, it should be noted that the particular or determinate 
genealogy of this ethical structure does not disqualify it from moral 
import; that would only be the case if we continued to operate with the 
hope of being able to step outside history, which is precisely what is chal-
lenged by Derrida. Instead, I would argue that we ought to: (1) recognize 
that every ethical and political framework must necessarily have a deter-
minate and historical origin, even a "religious" origin, broadly under-
stood"; and (2) recognize that the ethico-political ideal outlined by both 
Kant and Derrida finds its determinate heritage in the prophetic and 
Christian tradition. 
Further, it is not simply a question of the genealogy or heritage of this 
structure of ethical obligation (whether Kant's Categorical Imperative or 
Derrida' "messianic") which is a problem, nor is its universality per se. 
Instead, at issue is its mode of disclosure, revelation, or what we might 
describe-in a more Kantian gesture-as the question of its justificatiol1.34 
In other words, what is at stake is not the ontological universality of the 
messianic, but rather the epistemological particularity of its disclosure. As 
noted above, the particularity of the messianic's geo-political heritage does 
not disqualify it from universal ethical import; in other words, to disclose 
its determinate origin is not to argue that such an ethical obligation only 
applies to persons within that tradition. The (Jewish) understanding of 
obligation outlined by Emmanuel Levinas (precursor to Derrida's "mes-
sianic") is also understood to be universal in its scope; that is, it character-
izes all human intersubjective relationships. But it is only disclosed through 
a particular tradition, even a particular revelation, which must be shared 
by any who would understand this structure. At stake, then, is an episte-
mological issue, not an ontological one. Ontologie ally, the structure of 
obligation inheres in all human relationships, but it can only be "known" 
or "disclosed" through a particular revelation or faith-tradition. This is 
why the particular religion or revelation cannot function as a disposable 
"vehicle" in the sense that Kant suggests, because it is this particular tradi-
tion which is the condition for its disclosure or legitimation. The particular 
faith is the criterion for legitimation. What falters in postmodernity-and 
Derrida himself has contributed to its demise-is precisely the notion of a 
"reason" which could be a universal criterion for justifying just such a 
claim regarding the messianic. So what is disqualified is not the universali-
ty of the messianic, but rather any appeal or epistemological claim which 
could claim to 'demonstrate' its legitimacy outside of particular traditions 
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(i.e., outside particular "faiths").35 
This points to the second criticism. The notion of an autonomous or 
"pure" reason-untainted by either history or faith (or prejudice) is an 
Enlightenment myth. Derrida's project of thinking religion within the lim-
its of reason alone depends upon a heterogeneity between faith and knowl-
edge which presupposes that reason conducts itself within a pure, 
autonomous arena. Such a pure reason in Kant has been the subject of crit-
icism since Hegel. As Merold Westphal observes, "For Kant, the forms and 
categories that constitute the phenomenal world are at work in all human 
cognition, at all times, and in all places. But almost immediately people 
began to notice the operation of historically specific a priories constituting 
a variety of human worlds."36 In other words, reason itself is not free and 
cannot be free of all prejudice, but rather begins from certain cultural 
assumptions or, at the very least-as Derrida notes-an implicit trust in 
language. More specifically, as I have argued elsewhere/7 reason is always 
already grounded in a world view which constitutes a fundamental trust or 
commitment. As a result, faith and knowledge are not as heterogeneous as 
Kant and Derrida would have us believe. It is here that I would locate the 
Augustinian moment of this critique of Kant and Derrida: I do not believe 
only where I cannot know; rather, I believe in order to know. Faith-what-
ever that faith might be-is the necessary condition for knowledge. So 
their relation is not one of heterogeneity but rather dependence. Thus the 
attempt to think religion within the limits of reason alone would not be a 
project of formalization or secularization (attempting to distill a "purified" 
or "uncontaminated" rational religion), but more a kind of comparative 
theology: the attempt to think one faith within the limits of another faith. 
As such, the project itself becomes questionable, or at least the assump-
tions which motivate it would be dismantled. At that point it would seem 
fair to ask why the project should be carried out at all. That is not to say, of 
course, that one is opposed to enlightenment, or even critique; but it would 
open the space for a new appreciation of Enlightenment as "illumination." 
Loyola Marymount University 
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